{"id":17924,"date":"2021-03-05T11:35:46","date_gmt":"2021-03-05T00:35:46","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.socialpolicyconnections.com.au\/?p=17924"},"modified":"2021-03-05T11:35:55","modified_gmt":"2021-03-05T00:35:55","slug":"states-housed-40000-people-for-the-covid-emergency-now-rough-sleeper-numbers-are-back-on-the-up","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.socialpolicyconnections.com.au\/?p=17924","title":{"rendered":"States housed 40,000 people for the Covid emergency. Now rough sleeper numbers are back on the up."},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Hal Pawson<\/a> UNSW<\/a>.
Chris Martin<\/a> UNSW<\/a>. <\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Australian governments acted to protect homeless people from COVID-19 in 2020 on an even larger scale than previously thought<\/a>. In the first six months of the pandemic, the four states that launched emergency programs housed more than 40,000 rough sleepers and others.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The states were anxious about rough sleepers\u2019 extreme vulnerability to virus infection and the resulting public health risk to the wider community. New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and South Australia acted fast to provide safe temporary housing, mainly in otherwise empty hotels.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The need to house everyone has never been clearer than now. Here’s a two-step strategy to get it done<\/a><\/strong><\/em>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Drawing on previously unreleased official statistics, our newly published international comparative research<\/a> reveals the people these programs helped in Australia outnumbered the 33,000 rough sleepers and others<\/a> housed in England by the equivalent Everyone In initiative. Australia\u2019s population<\/a> is less than half that of England<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What happens when emergency housing ends?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The numbers needing shelter from Australia\u2019s emergency housing program showed our homelessness problem is much larger than often imagined. The 8,200 people counted as sleeping rough<\/a> on census night 2016 were only the tip of the iceberg.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Attempts to transfer people from emergency accommodation to long-term tenancies have also generally been far less successful than in England. By the end of 2020, England\u2019s local authorities had moved two-thirds<\/a> of their former rough sleepers from temporary placements to more stable housing. As our research<\/a> shows, despite determined efforts, Australian state governments managed this for less than a third of rough sleepers departing emergency hotel stays in 2020.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Many will have returned to the streets or to homeless shelters. Rough sleeper numbers once again increased in Adelaide and Sydney<\/a> after mid-year.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To a great extent Australia\u2019s poor showing reflects our growing social housing deficit<\/a>, as well as inadequate rent assistance and other social security benefits<\/a> (at their standard rates). All of these factors are barriers to helping low-income Australians into stable long-term housing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Coronavirus lays bare 5 big housing system flaws to be fixed<\/a><\/strong><\/em>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Eviction bans & rent variations defer problems<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Alongside protecting rough sleepers, Australian government actions to shield vulnerable renters who lost jobs and incomes in the pandemic were also relatively effective. These efforts include federal income protection (JobKeeper<\/a> and Coronavirus Supplement<\/a>) and state and territory restrictions on evictions<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The short-term success of these measures is clear. Despite a substantial rise in unemployment, there has been \u2013 as yet \u2013 no sign of any up-tick in homelessness<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time, though, ministerial advice<\/a> that tenants with COVID-triggered income losses should negotiate rent reductions with landlords came with few ground rules on how to reach such settlements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Survey evidence<\/a> shows many property owners refused to reduce rents. At least one in four renters lost income during the pandemic, but no more than 16% (and possibly as few as 8%) got a rent variation. And many variations were only in the form of rent deferrals, not reductions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The survey data imply at least 75,000 tenants, and possibly as many as 175,000, have been accumulating deferral-generated arrears. These mounting debts could put some at risk of losing their home when eviction moratoriums end. That\u2019s early in 2021 in most states and territories<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Cutting JobSeeker payments will cause crippling rental stress in our cities<\/a><\/strong><\/em>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Hands-off Commonwealth makes things worse<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Our research<\/a> also highlights the unusually small direct contribution of the Australian government to protecting homeless people during the pandemic. Even in other federations \u2013 Canada and the United States \u2013 national governments played a significant role.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Australia, the Commonwealth government made no direct input to covering the substantial costs involved. Nor did it play any part in even monitoring, let alone co-ordinating, the remarkable efforts of the active states.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Canberra has also steadfastly rejected<\/a> calls<\/a> for a social housing stimulus program for national economic recovery. This disengagement fits with a now-familiar refrain from federal ministers. Housing and homelessness, they repeat time and again, are constitutional obligations of state and territory governments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Why the focus of stimulus plans has to be construction which puts social housing first<\/a><\/strong><\/em>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why additional housing stimulus will be needed to sustain recovery<\/a><\/strong><\/em>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Granted, that\u2019s an accurate statement for housing and homelessness service delivery<\/em>. But, especially given the Commonwealth\u2019s control of the vital policy levers of tax and social security<\/a>, the two levels of government must in reality share responsibility for housing outcomes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Victorian government\u2019s A$5.4 billion Big Housing Build<\/a> shows states may commit to investment in social rental housing on a scale far beyond what had been thought possible. But the fact remains that state and territory governments have much less financial firepower than our national government. It\u2019s fanciful to imagine significant programs being widely initiated or maintained without hefty federal backing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Victoria’s $5.4bn Big Housing Build: it is big, but the social housing challenge is even bigger<\/a><\/strong><\/em>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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For all these reasons, when the pandemic has finally subsided, it\u2019s only with federal government leadership that we can effectively tackle the fundamental flaws in Australia\u2019s housing system. These have been glaringly exposed<\/a> by the public health crisis of the past 12 months. Without purposeful re-engagement by our national government, Australia\u2019s housing policy challenges will only continue to intensify.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Australia’s housing system needs a big shake-up: here’s how we can crack this<\/a><\/strong><\/em>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Hal Pawson<\/a> Professor of Housing Research & Policy, Associate Director City Futures Research Centre UNSW<\/a>.
Chris Martin<\/a> Senior Research Fellow City Futures Research Centre UNSW<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This article is republished from The Conversation<\/a> <\/em>under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Photo Richard Wainwright\/AAP. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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